'It should be a notoriety in law': the disciplinary rubrics in 1662 Holy Communion

Having reflected on the titles given to the Sacrament in the 1662 Communion Office, John Shepherd - in his 'The Order for the Administration of the Lord's Supper, or Holy Communion' in A Critical and Practical Elucidation of the Book of Common Prayer, Volume II (1801) - then turns to the opening disciplinary rubrics. The first directs the minister to exclude from the Sacrament "an open and notorious evil liver" by whose actions "the Congregation" has been "offended". The second rubric applies to "those betwixt whom [the Curate] perceiveth malice and hatred to reign". 

These are, of course, rubrics which - even though maintained by, for example, PECUSA 1789 and Ireland 1878 - have had little meaningful role in Anglican life over recent centuries, including the era in which Shepherd was writing. This, however, is not a matter of the rubrics being merely conveniently set aside. Shepherd demonstrates this by quoting extensively from a 1734 Visitation Charge by Thomas Sharp, Archdeacon of Northumberland (d.1758): Sharp, he said, had "fully and judiciously treated" the rubrics. This itself is instructive: nearly a century before Shepherd was compiling his thoughts on the Prayer Book Communion Office, Sharp was carefully explaining to clergy that these rubrics must be read cautiously and modestly, with a recognition of how they do not give an extensive power to clergy to exclude laity from the holy Sacrament.

Sharp notes that the second rubric's use of "notorious" is a "doubtful signification", with "uncertainty" attached to judging what is notorious and what is not, and "when the congregation may be said to be offended". He then introduced a major theme of his discussion of these rubrics:

For notoriety in fact is one thing; and notoriety in presumption is another. And in either case it should be a notoriety in law too, to indemnify the minister for proceeding upon the Rubric, or to render him safe, in point of law, for repelling any person from the Communion (emphasis added).

In other words, "open and notorious", Sharp insists, means a person under sentence of an ecclesiastical or secular court. He continues:

By a statute in the first year of Edward VI it is enacted, that the minister shall not, without a lawful cause, deny the Sacrament to any person that devoutly and humbly desires it. But what is this lawful cause? Why we are told that the law of England will not suffer the minister to judge any man a notorious offender, but him who is so convinced by some legal sentence. And it seems, according to the sense of the Civilians and Canonists, nothing amounts to notorium juris, or notoriety in law, less than a proof by confession in open court, or conviction by a sentence of the judge.

Sharp provides a specific example of this:

the 27th Canon, intitled 'Schismatics not to be admitted to the Communion', is express for their  exclusion; yet both the common lawyers and the civilians have given it as their opinion, that schismatics not lying under any ecclesiastical censure, and humbly and devoutly desiring the Sacrament, are not to be withheld from it, notwithstanding the direction of the Canon.

The rubric, therefore, is to be understood in the legal context in which it was formulated. That legal context significantly restrained and restricted clergy in excluding a person from Holy Communion.  Such restraint and restriction - via the need for a sentence in ecclesiastical or secular court - was wise and prudent, ensuring that clergy were not passing sentence upon others in the absence of due process, exercising an authority beyond what was rightful, recklessly undermining communal peace, or misusing the ministration of the Sacrament.

When it comes to the second of the disciplinary rubrics, concerning relationships within the parish, Sharp warns against clergy passing "a public and open censure upon secret crimes, to which none are privy but the parties and himself". 'Secret crimes', known only to the parties concerned, and privately known to the minister, cannot be a cause for exclusion from Holy Communion:

To this it hath been said, and I think justly, that every minister in the public execution of his office represents the Church, and is therefore to exclude none from the Sacraments, but such only as by the laws of the Church he is expressly required to exclude. That when he is secretly, and in his private capacity, apprized of any just impediment in any person, though he ought most solemnly to admonish him to refrain ... yet, when he celebrates in public, he is bound to admit such offending person offering himself, at his own peril; forasmuch as the Church is yet ignorant of any crime or default, for which, according to her rules, the Communion is to be withheld.

Here again we see a wise and prudent restriction on the ability of clergy to exclude from the Holy Communion. Private knowledge does not suffice. Secret offences do not suffice. This prevents a fundamental disordering of clergy pastoral relationships with laity, in which private conversations could lead to public acts of censure. An expectation that private conversations could expose private sins and broken relationships to public scrutiny and censure, would grievously undermine the clergy ministry of pastoral care and reconciliation. 

Sharp therefore rightly concludes his observations on the two disciplinary rubrics by reminding clergy that these rubrics must be understood in a context defined by two greater duties and responsibilities:

it will greatly concern him to act with the utmost care, fidelity, and circumspection, that he do not either deprive any persons of the privilege of Christian Communion, or set upon them such a public mark of infamy and disgrace a repulse from the Sacrament is commonly held to be, without a real necessity to justify his conduct herein.

Sharp's analysis, quoted at such length by Shepherd, explains why these disciplinary rubrics at the outset of the 1662 Holy Communion have not been significant factors in Anglican experience: put simply, they have never been a significant or widely-used provision because the dangers attendant to their routine use were understood to be too damaging to the church's pastoral ministry and sacramental life.

These rubrics and Sharp's analysis also provide a context for understanding the purpose of the relevant provisions of canon law in other Anglican churches which retained these rubrics in their BCP revisions. The wisdom, caution, prudence, and moderation with which Sharp understood the rubrics is likewise to be applied to such canonical provisions, ensuring - for the sake of the Church's peace and pastoral ministry - that their application will be, necessarily, exceedingly rare. 

Finally, Sharp's reading also explains why these rubrics should not be invoked to support any contemporary attempt to impose a sacramental discipline in order to further particular agendas. There have been recent cases of both progressive Episcopalians and conservative Anglicans declaring support for excluding from Holy Communion particular categories of people: in both cases, such categories neatly coincide with culture war opponents. This demonstrates exactly why Sharp's reading of the disciplinary rubrics continues to be necessary.